Mali is a landlocked West African country famous for the ancient scholarship of Timbuktu. It is Africa's second-largest gold producer, an industry that provides more than half of tax revenues.
A military junta seized power in a coup in May 2021. Assimi Goïta, the "interim" president, extended his term until at least 2030. His rise was initially welcomed by Malians fed up with escalating jihadist violence and frustrated with decades of French influence. The junta accused France and a UN peacekeeping mission of being combat-shy and turned instead to the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary outfit, which arrived a few months after the coup.
Despite the Russian presence, security has worsened. Some 2,000 Russian fighters were stationed in Mali by 2025, compared with around 5,000 French troops across the Sahel at the peak of France's anti-jihadist mission (which began winding down in 2021) and 12,000 UN peacekeepers before the coup. Deaths linked to jihadists averaged 3,135 per year from 2022 to 2024, compared with 736 over the previous decade, according to ACLED. JNIM, the pre-eminent jihadist network in the Sahel, has expanded its footprint, attacking economic hubs such as Kayes, a town on the road to Dakar, the port capital of Senegal. Islamist violence is even worse in neighbouring Burkina Faso, where few Russians are deployed.
Wagner helped the army retake the northern city of Kidal in 2023, a high point. But its brutal methods—murdering civilians, running blockades around towns—have dried up informants and driven separatists and jihadists to work together against Wagner and the army. In August 2025 dozens of soldiers, including generals who had criticised Wagner, were purged.
Local digital influencers known as vidéomans dominate Malian media and have done so since well before the Wagner Group's arrival. Some have ties, allegedly including financial ones, to the government, though many simply share the authorities' views. Their influence predated and in some ways prefigured the Russian disinformation campaigns that followed.
In September 2025 JNIM launched a fuel blockade of Bamako. By November the city had only about 10% of pre-blockade fuel volumes; a litre of petrol fetched up to 5,000 CFA francs ($8.80) on the black market, more than six times the official price. Transport costs doubled, electricity fell from 12 hours a day to six, and businesses closed or laid off staff. The junta reportedly traded a partial easing of the blockade for the release of around 30 prisoners. Africa Corps escorts helped protect some convoys.
On April 25th 2026 JNIM, in alliance with ethnic Tuareg separatists, killed Mali's defence minister with a suicide-bomber. Two days later the Malian army and allied Russian troops began retreating from towns and bases across the north. Last year America shared intelligence that helped the Malian army conduct strikes on jihadist leaders, and in February 2026 sent a top State Department official to discuss normalising ties; soon after, it lifted sanctions on three Malian officers, including the (now deceased) defence minister. A deal would let America resume flying intelligence-gathering aircraft and drones in Malian airspace. Flagship Gold Corp, a mining firm based in New York, struck a deal with Mali's state-owned miner in October 2025.
The junta resisted Russian entreaties to transfer large gold mines run by Western firms. Sadio Camara, the defence minister, has closer links with the Russians, but Goïta appears keen to diversify. The Trump administration has sent officials to Bamako, the capital, to discuss security help and mineral deals. Turkey, a source of drones, is increasingly influential with Goïta, and Gulf states are active too. In June 2025 Russia's Wagner presence was formally rebranded as Africa Corps, with a clearer line of responsibility to Moscow.
Time to take stock. Go home with some office supplies.