Moldova is a former Soviet republic of 2.4m people squeezed between Ukraine and Romania. Its president is Maia Sandu, who leads the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS).
In 2024 Moldova opened accession negotiations with the European Union. A referendum on joining the EU in October 2024 passed with only 50.3% support. About a third of the electorate is strongly pro-European, a third is pro-Russian, and the rest are moderately pro-European or somewhere in between.
In elections held on September 28th 2025, PAS won 50.2% of the votes, aided by voters in the diaspora, most of them working in EU countries. The Patriotic Bloc, a Russia-friendly coalition of left-wing parties, got 24.2%; three smaller opposition parties also made it over the 5% threshold. The result gave PAS enough seats to form a new government, but the country remains polarised and economically weak. PAS promises to take Moldova into the EU as soon as 2028, though that will be up to the bloc's members. The result was probably less a sign of approval for PAS's policies than of fear of losing the country's independence to Russia.
Moldova is one of the poorest countries in Europe. Its economy has been stagnant since it emerged from covid-19. Inflation is running at over 7% year on year and the annual trade deficit amounts to $4bn, or 20% of GDP. According to Moldova's government, the Kremlin spent $200m—the equivalent of 1% of Moldova's GDP—on disinformation and bribing voters. The opposition accused the government of fearmongering and undermining the democratic process. The government shut down opposition television channels without court authorisation, portrayed political opponents as traitors and Russian stooges, and withheld economic statistics during the campaign. Residents of Transnistria, a breakaway pro-Russian enclave that hosts no polling stations for Moldovan elections, normally vote in neighbouring regions; the government slashed voting locations for Transnistrians by more than half and closed several bridges connecting Transnistria to Moldova proper on election day.
Russia has mounted extensive campaigns to influence Moldovan elections, including disinformation, vote-buying and paramilitary training of Moldovans by Russian instructors in Serbia and Bosnia. Bot networks on Telegram, TikTok and Facebook supplement payments to local influencers to spread fabricated stories. During Ms Sandu's 2024 presidential re-election, she required overwhelming support from Moldovan voters abroad to win a second term.
Ilan Shor, a fugitive oligarch convicted for his role in the theft of $1bn from Moldova's banks in 2014, organised vote-buying schemes from Russia during both the 2024 referendum and presidential election, according to Moldovan intelligence services.
Vlad Plahotniuc, another oligarch, spent several years before 2019 as Moldova's unofficial leader: although nominally a mere MP, he in effect controlled all government institutions through his Democratic Party. The police were his personal enforcers; intimidation and blackmail were the order of the day. He was arrested in Athens on July 22nd 2025; police found he had 17 forged passports or identity cards and had stayed in 22 countries since 2023 to avoid detection.
A court determined that Plahotniuc's organisation conspired to steal $1bn from Moldova's banks between 2013 and 2015 and launder it through shell companies—equivalent to an eighth of GDP at the time. In a separate case, Moldova was a linchpin in a scheme to launder $20bn of dirty Russian money, according to the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. On April 22nd 2026 Plahotniuc was sentenced to 19 years in prison and fined $60m. Iulian Groza, director of the Institute for European Policies and Reforms, called the conviction proof that judicial reform is starting to work, though "too early to claim victory". Maia Sandu has complained that cleaning up the judiciary faces huge resistance.
Collaboration, n.: A literary partnership based on the false assumption that the other fellow can spell.