Myanmar is a country the size of Ukraine. After a coup in 1962, it suffered 49 years of military rule. Between 2011 and 2021, the army relinquished some power, and for a while Aung San Suu Kyi was allowed to front a government. In 2021 the army fully retook power in a coup and began massacring civilian protesters. The junta is led by General Min Aung Hlaing. Myanmar has 22,000 political prisoners. Since the coup, nearly 10,000 civilians have been killed. The UN estimates 3m have been displaced and over 2m are on the brink of famine. The economy has fallen by a quarter in nominal terms since 2019, and is estimated to be around half the size of its pre-coup trajectory. In March 2025 a 7.7 magnitude earthquake hit Myanmar, killing 3,740 people.
Young people who survived attacks on counter-coup protests fled to the country's mountainous borderlands, where they were trained and armed by ethnic-minority armies that have fought the government on-and-off for decades. These new resistance fighters, mostly from the Bamar majority ethnic group, returned to the arid centre of the country known as the "dry zone", where they challenge the junta by attacking its convoys and operating their own schools and clinics. The junta responds through air strikes and search-and-destroy missions. The resistance movement calls itself the Spring Revolution.
The ethnic armies along the periphery can be divided into two camps. Those along the Thai and Indian borders tend to be more pro-Western and more supportive of the Spring Revolution. Those along the Chinese border have closer ties to China; several have historical links with China's Communist Party, having emerged in 1989 from the Burmese Communist Party.
In October 2023 a coalition of China-linked ethnic groups known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched a surprise attack—dubbed Operation 1027 after its launch date of October 27th—on junta positions in Shan State in the east, and a few weeks later in Rakhine State in the west. Within two months they had handed the army a string of defeats greater than any since the years immediately following independence from Britain in 1948. The Brotherhood's offensive was probably approved by China, which wanted to clear out scam centres trafficking Chinese citizens. After the Brotherhood accomplished these goals, China pushed the two sides to sign a truce.
In June 2024 the Brotherhood groups broke the truce. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), one of the Alliance's members, successfully assaulted the city of Lashio in Shan State and the junta's Eastern Operations Command—the first time such a large city or military base had been seized by rebels. Another group started down the road to Mandalay, stopping just outside the hill station above the city where the military's service academies sit. Fearing these offensives might cause the junta to collapse, China imposed what Deng Xijun, its special envoy for Asian affairs, called the "five cuts": severing electricity, water, internet access, movement of people and the flow of goods. China also detained Peng Deren, the MNDAA's leader, while he was visiting China. The Brotherhood relented; the MNDAA signed a ceasefire with the junta—which China's foreign ministry said the two sides were grateful to China for "facilitating"—and in April 2025 Lashio was handed back to the military.
A transcript acquired by The Economist, said to record an August 2024 meeting between Deng Xijun and leaders of the United Wa State Army (one of Myanmar's most powerful rebel groups), reveals Deng ordering the Wa to stop co-operating with the MNDAA, accusing it of being "two-faced" and of building alliances with pro-democracy groups backed by America and the West. He warned that if the Wa continued to help the MNDAA, China would go after them too. The Wa subsequently announced on social media that they would no longer support the MNDAA.
The MNDAA's stronghold is Laukkai, where it now offers permanent residency to Chinese citizens who invest at least 500,000 yuan ($70,000)—perhaps betting that China would not allow the junta to attack a town full of Chinese nationals.
China engages both the junta and its opponents. Its interests include ensuring stability along its border and along trade routes to the Indian Ocean, protecting Chinese investments, shutting down scam centres targeting Chinese citizens, and limiting Western influence. A 2,500km oil-and-gas pipeline runs from Myanmar's south-western coast through the conflict zone to Kunming, the capital of China's Yunnan province; it remains entirely unmolested, with groups on both sides careful to avoid damaging it.
China's greatest fear is that pro-democracy groups will come to power and turn Myanmar into a base of Western influence. It has empowered groups that align with its worldview and threatened to cut off ethnic militias that train or equip pro-democracy groups without authorisation. By throttling supply lines, China keeps pro-democracy revolutionaries from growing too powerful while preserving leverage over them.
Over the past year China has pushed General Min Aung Hlaing to hold an election at the end of 2025, hoping that following the vote he will be elected president, shed his uniform and hand over army command. But an election held under the junta without a ceasefire would be a sham. What China likely wants is a frozen conflict, giving it maximum leverage over all groups.
Only 39% of the $1bn the UN requested in humanitarian aid for Myanmar in 2024 was granted. The United States Congress appropriated $121m in additional cash for democratic groups, but the Trump administration's closure of USAID has curtailed support.
Thailand and India have backed the junta and encouraged other countries to normalise relations with it. Thaksin Shinawatra, a Thai tycoon and former prime minister, has led a drive to legitimise General Min Aung Hlaing, inviting him to summits at his hotel in Bangkok.
In 2023 Indonesia's then foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, brought all four warring factions—the junta, the democratic resistance, pro-democracy ethnic militias and China-friendly ethnic militias—to Jakarta for proximity talks. Each stayed at a different hotel, with Indonesian diplomats relaying messages between them.
ASEAN members, among them Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, were outspoken in objecting to the coup. They helped persuade fellow members to ban Min Aung Hlaing from ASEAN summits. Myanmar's lower-ranking officials still attend some meetings, but the junta can no longer veto ASEAN decisions and its views carry little weight. The junta has not been formally suspended, nor have its pro-democratic opponents been seated.
The Arakan Army (AA), which represents Rakhine's Buddhist majority, now controls most of Rakhine state. It is accused of launching attacks on the Rohingyas, a much-persecuted Muslim minority, including a massacre that killed hundreds in a village in 2024. The UN says the AA has committed "numerous abuses and violations"; the AA denies targeting Rohingyas, saying it targets only armed militants. Since the start of 2024, more than 150,000 additional Rohingyas have fled to refugee camps in Bangladesh.
On December 28th 2025 the junta began a sham election in three phases, concluding on January 25th 2026. The generals insist that any constituency able to open even a single polling station will elect a member of parliament. In large swathes of the country fighting makes voting impossible. Some 55 parties have registered, in addition to the junta's preferred political party, but all credible opposition has been banned. More than 200 people have been arrested and charged with interfering with the poll. The junta stepped up offensives ahead of the vote to ensure it could open polling stations in as many places as possible.
The poll may give the junta the appearance of legitimacy. ASEAN members shunned Myanmar after the 2021 massacre of protesters, but some South-East Asian countries have started to regret cold-shouldering the regime and are looking for an excuse to reopen talks. Foreign diplomats speculate that after the election Min Aung Hlaing will give up one of his two titles—president or commander-in-chief—to mollify rivals without giving up real power. Chinese diplomats, who are said to find Min Aung Hlaing difficult to work with, have been pushing him to hold the vote.
The newly elected parliament held its first meeting on March 16th 2026. Everyone expects Min Aung Hlaing to stay in charge, probably as president—a post he covets because it would allow him to attend international summits. Yet the general may also worry that giving up his job as commander-in-chief could create an opening for a usurper. The new leadership will probably be formally appointed by early April.
The end of 2025 marked a stunning reversal for Myanmar's revolutionaries. At the end of 2024 they had appeared to have the junta on the run; for a time it had seemed possible that resistance forces might lay siege to Mandalay.
Four factors explain the turnaround. First, China cut supply lines to rebel groups along its border, for fear of instability if the junta fell. It kidnapped the leader of one rebel group that refused to return territory, releasing him only after he signed a truce with the junta. It also ordered two big rebel groups to stop selling ammunition to other rebel armies, leaving fighters desperately short of bullets.
Second, Donald Trump's closure of USAID hit rebel-held populations hard. USAID never supplied armed groups directly but did provide food aid to populations under their care. In Karenni state, along the Thai border, rebels had to shift 60% of their military budget (about $10m) to humanitarian needs; they have since lost the state's biggest settlements to a junta counter-offensive.
Third, the junta began conscripting young men in 2024. Analysts think there are now 80,000 to 100,000 conscripts in its forces, many often high on amphetamines, thought to have received training from Russian advisers who have seen combat in Ukraine. They are sent to attack rebel positions in huge waves.
Fourth, the junta has become more innovative in the air, acquiring much Chinese drone kit and Russian-supplied bombers and helicopters. Soldiers in the centre of the country have been attacking schools and health clinics in rebel-held areas using motorised paragliders—piloted by lone soldiers who drop bombs by hand—similar to those employed by Hamas when it attacked Israel on October 7th 2023. Officers are feeding their troops methamphetamines.
Tayzar San, a doctor who led the first protest against the junta in 2021, remains Myanmar's most wanted man. He regularly surfaces in rebel-held settlements to lead demonstrations.
When the military staged its coup in 2021, around a quarter of the population were in poverty; by March 2026, half are. Thailand had already banned fuel exports to parts of Myanmar; the 2026 Iran war disrupted Middle Eastern oil supplies further, pushing up inflation, which was already high. The government has responded by promoting import substitution—international brands are disappearing from supermarket shelves in favour of locally made alternatives—and by introducing fuel-saving measures such as an even-odd licence-plate driving system in Yangon. Some 300 army officers study in Russian military academies each year and are bringing home Putinesque ideas about how to run an economy; for them, autarky is preferable to prosperity.
For people with money, life in Yangon can still be good: "mules" carrying consumer goods fill inbound flights. But America and Britain have stopped issuing visas to students from Myanmar. Some young people are learning Japanese, hoping to be recruited as care workers in Japan. Other options include scam centres on the border with Thailand or sex work in Singapore.
Myanmar's civil war has allowed a completely unregulated rare-earth mining industry to flourish. Chinese refiners rely on cheap Myanmar ore as feedstock alongside domestic supply.
The UN estimates there are 4.6m Burmese in Thailand, about half of whom arrived since the 2021 coup. Some 40% are undocumented. Thailand has not signed the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and does not formally offer protection to asylum-seekers. Arrivals who have fled conscription in Myanmar have in some cases been handed straight back to the army.
Myanmar is home to one of the world's largest online-fraud industries. Myawaddy, a town on the border with Thailand, is among the world's biggest fraud hubs. According to some estimates, the industry dwarfs the global illicit-drug trade in value. The United Nations reckons at least 120,000 people remain captive in scam facilities in Myanmar. Globally, this illegal business may have as many as 1.5m coerced and voluntary workers, according to the United States Institute of Peace.
Victims are recruited through social-media messages promising high-paying jobs abroad, then spirited across borders and coerced through torture into defrauding people online. Workers come from around the world, including Africa, India and the Philippines. Many now arrive voluntarily, aware their role will involve conning others.
China has arrested hundreds of thousands of its own citizens for their involvement in scamming and has been putting pressure on the governments of Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos to do more. On September 29th 2025 China sentenced 16 people to death for running scam operations in northern Myanmar.
In January 2025 the trafficking of Wang Xing, a Chinese actor, into a Myanmar scam compound ignited outrage in China, prompting the Chinese government to press Thai and Myanmar authorities to act. In February some 7,000 people were released from compounds in Myawaddy, though experts describe this as a calculated pruning of the workforce rather than a genuine crackdown. The compounds are mostly run by the Kayin Border Guard Force, a powerful militia. Repatriation of freed workers is hampered by red tape and the inability or unwillingness of some governments to pay for flights home.
In 2025 Russia agreed to help Myanmar's military junta construct a small modular reactor near Naypyidaw.
The trouble with the rat-race is that even if you win, you're still a rat.